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Software safety remains one of the essential and vital aspects in today’s systems. Software is becoming
responsible for most of the critical functions of systems. Therefore, the software components in the systems
need to be tested extensively against their safety requirements to ensure a high level of system safety.
However, performing testing exhaustively to test all software behaviours is impossible. Numerous testing
approaches exist. However, they do not directly concern the information derived during the safety analysis.
STPA (Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis) is a unique safety analysis approach based on system and
control theory, and was developed to identify unsafe scenarios of a complex system including software. In
this paper, we present a testing approach based on STPA to automatically generate test cases from the STPA
safety analysis results to help software and safety engineers to recognize and reduce the associated software
risks. We also provide an open-source safety-based testing tool called STPA TCGenerator to support the
proposed approach. We illustrate the proposed approach with a prototype of a software of the Adaptive
Cruise Control System (ACC) with a stop-and-go function with a Lego-Mindstorms EV3 robot.
CCS Concepts: rSoftware and its engineering → Formal software verification; Software safety;
Software testing and debugging;
Additional Key Words and Phrases: safety-critical software, STPA safety analysis, software safety Formal
software verification, test case generation
1. INTRODUCTION
Software has become an indispensable part of many modern systems and often performs
the main safety-critical functions. Hence, software safety must be analysed in a system
context to gain a comprehensive understanding of the roles of software and to identify the
software-related risks that can cause hazards in the system. A software failure may lead to
catastrophic results such as injury or loss of human life, damaged property or environmental
disturbances. Therefore, it becomes essential to test the software components for unexpected
behaviour before using them in practice [Minister of Defence 1991]. The Toyota Prius, the
General Motors airbag and the loss of the Mars Polar Lander (MPL) mission [JPL 2000] are
well-known software problems in which the software played an important role in the loss,
although the software had been successfully verified against all functional requirements.
Software testing is a crucial process to assess the quality of the software and determine
whether it meets its specified requirements. The term software safety testing [NASA-GB-
8719.13 2004] was introduced and implies that software testing should not only address
functional requirements, but the software safety requirements as well. Therefore, the pro-
cess for testing safety-critical software combines conventional testing and safety analysis
approaches to focus the testing efforts in a specific way to address the safety of the software
and test the critical risky situations. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [Vesely et al. 1981] and
Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) [International 1967] are the ap-
proaches commonly used for the purpose of safety-based testing. However, these approaches
focus only on single component failures and they have limitations to cope with complex sys-
tems including software. Leveson [Leveson 2011] noted that the primary safety problem in
software-intensive systems is not software failure but the lack of appropriate constraints on
software behaviour. The solution is to identify the required constraints and enforce them
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in the software and overall system design. Therefore, a new safety analysis technique called
STPA [Leveson 2011] has been developed to overcome the limitations of the traditional
techniques in addressing the unsafe scenarios of complex systems.
1.1. Problem Statement
The complexity of safety-critical software makes exhaustive software testing impossible.
In addition, existing testing approaches and tools do not incorporate the information de-
rived from safety analysis sufficiently. Integrating the information from safety analysis into
software testing creates a number of challenges. First, defining appropriate software safety
requirements with traditional safety analysis techniques is difficult due to their limitations
to cope with complex systems including software. Second, the traditional techniques such
as FTA and FMECA do not provide any kind of model to represent the system behaviour.
Third, the safety requirements usually are written in natural language which makes it hard
to map them directly to the test model.
1.2. Research Objectives
The overall objective of this research is to fill the aforementioned gap by investigating the
possibility of automatically generating safety-based test cases from the information derived
during the safety analysis. This will help safety and software engineers to recognize the
unexpected software behaviours that may contribute to an accident and avoid them.
1.3. Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is an automatic safety-based testing approach to gen-
erate safety-based test cases using the information derived from STPA safety analysis. We
provide four main contributions: (1) We develop an algorithm based on STPA to derive
unsafe software scenarios and automatically translate them into a formal specification in
LTL (Linear Temporal Logic) [Pnueli 1977]. (2) We explore how to build the safe soft-
ware behavioural model based on the STPA control structure diagram. (3) We develop an
algorithm to automatically extract the safe test model and check its correctness by auto-
matically transforming it into an SMV representation (Symbolic Model Verifier) [McMillan
1993] and verify it against the STPA safety requirements using the NuSMV model checker
[Cimatti et al. 1999]. (4) We develop an algorithm to automatically generate the traceability
matrix between the STPA software safety requirements and the test model and generate
the safety-based test cases for each safety requirement from the test model.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. STPA Safety Analysis & Software Safety
STPA (Systems-Theoretic Processes Analysis) [Leveson 2011] is a top-down process based
on the accident model called STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes).
STPA is developed for generating detailed safety requirements of complex and modern
systems to prevent the occurrence of unsafe scenarios in the systems. In STPA, the system
is seen as a set of interrelated components which interact with each other to provide a
dynamic equilibrium through feedback loops of information and control. STPA has three
main steps: (1) Establish the fundamentals of the analysis (e.g. system-level accidents and
the associated hazards) and draw the control structure diagram of the system (shown in Fig.
1). (2) Use the control structure diagram to identify the potential unsafe control actions.
(3) Determine how each potentially unsafe control action could occur by identifying the
process model and its variables for each controller and analysing each path in the control
structure diagram.
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Fig. 1. A general feedback control structure of a software system
An extended approach to STPA is proposed by Thomas [Thomas 2013] for identifying
the unsafe control actions which are identified in STPA Step 2 based on the combinations
of process model variables of each controller in the control structure diagram.
The basic components in STPA are safety constraints, unsafe control actions, unsafe
scenarios, control structure diagram and process models. A control structure diagram is
made up of basic feedback control loops. An example is shown in Fig. 1. When put together,
they can be used to model the high-level control structure of a particular system.
Definition 2.1 (A Control Structure Diagram). The Control Structure Diagram (CSD)
of a software system S can be expressed with five-tuples (CO , AC , SO , CP , CA), where CO
is a set (one or more) of the software controllers which control the controlled processes (CP)
by issuing control actions to the actuators, AC is a set of the actuators which implement
the control actions (CA) of the controller, CP is a set of the controlled processes which are
controlled by controllers (COs). SO is a set of sensors which send the feedback about the
status of the controlled process.
Each controller in the control structure diagram must contain a model of the assumed
state of the controlled process, called the process model [Leveson 2011]. A process model
contains one or more variables, the required relationships among the variables, the current
state and the logic of how the process can change state. This model is used to determine
what control actions are needed. It is updated through various forms of feedback [Leveson
2011].
Definition 2.2 (A Software Controller). A software controller CO i can be expressed for-
mally as a two-tuple CO i = (CA,PM ), where CA is set of the control actions and PM
is the process model of the controller which has a set of Process Model Variables (PMV ),
which are a set of states that have an effect on the safety of CA: PMV =
⋃
(P1 . . .Pn).
In [Abdulkhaleq et al. 2015], we classified the process model variables of the software
controller that affect the safety of the critical control actions into three types: 1) Internal
variables which change the status of the software controller, 2) Interaction interface variables
which receive and store the data/command/feedback from the other components in the
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system, and 3) Environmental variables of the environmental components that interact
with or are controlled by the software controller.
To support the safety engineering process based on STPA, we developed an extensible
platform called XSTAMPP1 [Abdulkhaleq and Wagner 2015b] which is an open-source
platform written in Java based on the Eclipse Plug-in-Development Environment (PDE)
and Rich Client Platform (RCP). XSTAMPP supports performing the three main steps
of STPA and provides an internal representation in XML for each STPA component to
support possible future integration with other tools.
2.2. Software Safety Testing
Software testing is one of the most important phases during the software development
process to confirm that the software complies with its requirements, and ensure that the
software performs all required functions correctly. A popular testing approach called Model-
based Testing (MBT) [Dalal et al. 1999; Apfelbaum and Doyle 1997] aims at automatically
generating test cases using models extracted from software requirements. The model-based
testing process involves creating a suitable model of the software’s behaviour based on
requirements or an existing specification to generate the test cases.
A number of software behaviour models are in use today, several make good models for
testing such as control flow charts, finite state machines, SpecTRM-RL [Leveson 2000], and
sequence event diagrams. Finite state machines are commonly used in software behaviour
modeling and testing to generate test cases [Apfelbaum and Doyle 1997]. The finite state
model includes a set of states, a set of input events and the transition between them.
The main challenge of software testing is to generate suitable test cases that cover all
requirements and functions of the software.
Software safety testing [NASA-GB- 8719.13 2004; Lutz 2000] is a crucial process in devel-
oping safety-critical systems to verify whether a software system meets its safety require-
ments. Safety-critical software should be tested extensively to ensure that the potential
software-related hazards have been eliminated or controlled to a low level of risk.
3. RELATED WORK
In the following, we will discuss our own prior work and the related work.
3.1. Risk-Based Software Testing
There are quite a few software safety test techniques in the literature that combine safety
analysis principles with model-based testing. Most of them use the term ”Risk-based Test-
ing”, which combines risk analysis approaches such as FTA and/or FMEA or the Markov
chain with software testing approaches (e.g. model-based testing) to create a prioritization
criterion for generating test cases.
Redmill [Redmill 2004] explored the benefits of risk-based testing as the basis of test
planning in the software testing process and how to understand the risks of the system to
focus test efforts. He does not show how to generate the test cases from the risk analysis
approach.
Zimmermann et al. [Zimmermann et al. 2009] proposed a refinement-based approach to
the reliability analysis of software-critical systems. They used model-based statistical testing
as a model-based testing technique and the Markov chain model to model the system under
test. They also used FTA and FMEA as risk-based analysis techniques to identify the critical
situations that represent high risk.
Kools et al. [Kloos et al. 2011] proposed a model-based testing approach which uses the
information derived from FTA in combination with a system model to generate the risk-
based test cases. They used FTA to select, generate and prioritize the test cases. They
1http://www.xstampp.de
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Fig. 2. An overview of the proposed approach
derived the test cases from the combination of fault trees and a basic system behaviour
model called the ”base model”.
Our approach uses a similar principle of combining the risk analysis approaches with
model-based testing but the difference is that our approach uses STPA for safety analysis
based on system and control theory rather than reliability theory like FTA and FMEA.
STPA copes with the analysis of complex, modern systems and tackles the dynamic be-
haviour of the system by treating safety as a control problem. Furthermore, STPA provides
an abstract model of the system under analysis called the safety control structure which
views all main interacting components including the software components of the system.
This allows us to directly construct the test model from the control structure diagram and
constrain its transitions with the STPA-generated safety requirements.
3.2. STPA SwISs Approach for Software-Intensive Systems
Developing safety-critical software requires a more systematic software and safety engi-
neering process that enables the software and safety engineers to recognize the potential
software risks. For this purpose, we proposed a comprehensive software safety engineering
approach based on STPA for Software-Intensive Systems, called STPA SwISs [Abdulkhaleq
et al. 2015]. STPA SwISs provides a concept of deriving the software safety requirements
by STPA at the system level, modeling them as a safe behavioural model and automati-
cally generating test cases from this model by using an existing model-based tool such as
Preprint, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: October 2016.
:6 Abdulkhaleq and Wagner
ModelJUnit [Utting and Legeard 2007]. The STPA SwISs approach is carried out in three
major steps: 1) Deriving the software safety requirements at the system level, and gener-
ating the unsafe scenarios based on the extended approach to STPA by Thomas [Thomas
2013], and expressing the corresponding safety requirements in formal specifications using
LTL; 2) Modeling STPA results with a safe behavioural model. A safe behavioural model is
a UML statechart notation that models the process model variables of a software controller
in the STPA control structure diagram as states and the control actions as the state actions,
and it is constrained by the STPA-generated software safety requirements (transitions); and
3) Generating the safety-based test cases by using an existing model-based tool.
Our preliminary algorithm [Abdulkhaleq et al. 2015] for deriving test cases from STPA
results relied on using an existing model-based testing tool called ModelJUnit to drive the
test cases. This algorithm is effective in deriving test cases but it has some limitations: 1)
ModelJUnit requires that a behavioural model be written as a Java class, which represents
the finite state machine of the system; 2) The ModelJUnit tool has not been developed
with the purpose of safety-based testing and deriving the test cases from the safety analysis
results; 3) there is no way to verify and check the correctness of a test input model of
ModelJUnit against the safety analysis results; and 4) The ModelJUnit tool does not provide
a traceability matrix between the safety requirements and the generated test cases.
4. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
In this section, we propose an automatic safety-based test case generation approach for
deriving test cases directly from the STPA safety analysis results. The proposed approach
follows the main steps of the STPA SwISs approach and provides a high degree of automa-
tion of each step.
Figure 2 shows the main steps of the approach which includes four steps: 1) deriving the
software safety requirements of a software controller by following the STPA SwISs approach
[Abdulkhaleq et al. 2015] and automatically expressing them in LTL, 2) constructing the
safe behavioural model of the software controller with the statechart notations in Simulink,
3) transforming the safe behavioural model into an input model of the NuSMV model
checker and checking the correctness of the generated model against the STPA and safety
requirements expressed in LTL; and 4) automatically generating a safety-based test model
and deriving the safety-based test cases from this model. In the following sections, we
describe the four major activities in more detail:
4.1. Deriving Software Safety Requirements
This step starts by applying STPA to the system specification to identify STPA software
safety requirements and the potentially unsafe scenarios which the software can contribute
to. The algorithm starts by establishing the fundamentals of analysis by determining the
system-level accidents (ACC) and the associated system-level hazards (HA) which the
software can lead to or contribute in. Next, the algorithm demands that the safety control
structure diagram of the system shall be constructed from the system specifications. The
software here is the controller in the control structure diagram.
For each software controller component in the control diagram, its software safety re-
quirements can be derived by performing the following steps:
(1) Identify all safety-critical Control Actions (CAs) that can lead to one or more of the
associated hazards (HA).
(2) Evaluate each CA with four general types of hazardous behaviours to identify the Unsafe
Control Actions (UCAs): (a) a control action required for safety is not provided, (b) an
unsafe action is provided, (c) a potentially safe control action is provided too early, too
late or out of sequence and (d) a safe control action is stopped too soon or continued
too long.
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(3) Translate the identified UCAs manually into informal textual Software Safety Require-
ments (SSR).
(4) Identify the process model and its variables and include them in the software controller
in the control structure diagram to understand how eachUCA could occur. The process
model describes the states of the software controller (only critical states which are
relevant to the safety of the control actions) and their variables describe the software
communication, input and output.
(5) Automatically generate the critical set of combinations of the process model variables
for each control action (CA). Each combination should be evaluated within two contexts
(C1= Providing CA or C2 = Not Providing CA) to determine whether the control
action is hazardous in that context or not. A control action CA could be considered
hazardous in context C if only a combination of process variables related to CA leads
to a system-level hazard H ∈ HA. The context C1 = Providing CA has three types
of sub-contexts: context incorrectness, in which the unsafe control action commanded
incorrectly and caused a hazard (any time), context real-time execution, in which the
unsafe control action commanded in a wrong timing (too early or too late) or sequence,
and context execution mechanism, in which the unsafe control action commanded in a
wrong mechanism of execution (applied too long or stopped too soon).
(6) Identify the potentially unsafe critical combination of unsafe software control action
and evaluate it to identify the potential unsafe scenarios of the software.
Definition 4.1 (Refined Unsafe Control Action). The refined unsafe control action
(RUCA) is a four-tuple (CA, Cs, C, TC), where CA is a control action which causes a
hazard H ∈ HA, Cs = ⋃(P1 = v1, . . .Pn = vn) which is a critical set of combinations of
the relevant process model variables PMV of CA, C is a context where providing or not
providing the control action CA is hazardous, and TC is the type of context providing of
control action CA (any time, too early or too late).
To automatically translate each critical combination of process model variables for each
control action CA into the unsafe software scenarios, we set the following rules:
Rule 1: Each refined unsafe control action (RUCA) in the context of Providing (C1)
of a control action CAi can be expressed as:
RUCAi = <CA> provided <TC> is hazardous when <Cs=
⋃
(P1 = v1, . . .Pn =
vn)> occurred.
Rule 2: Each refined unsafe control action (RUCA) in the context of Not Providing
(C2) of a control action CAi can be expressed as:
RUCAi = <CA> Not provided is hazardous when <Cs=
⋃
(P1 = v1, . . .Pn = vn)>
occurred.
By using the rules 1 and 2, we refine the unsafe control actions which are identified based
on the combination set of process model variables. The software safety requirements are
generated automatically from the refined unsafe control actions. Based on definition 3, we
identify the following rules which are used to automatically generate the Refined Software
Safety Requirements (RSSR):
Rule 3: Each RUCAi in the context Providing (C1) of control action CAi can be
transformed automatically into a new software safety requirement as follows:
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RSSRi = <CA> must Not be Provided <TC> when <Cs=
⋃
(P1 = v1, . . .Pn =
vn)> occurred.
Rule 4: Each RUCAi in the context Not Providing (C2) of control action CAi can be
transformed automatically into a new software safety requirement as follows:
RSSRi = <CA> must be Provided when <Cs=
⋃
(P1 = v1, . . .Pn = vn)> occurred.
4.2. Automatically Formalizing Safety Requirements in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
In [Abdulkhaleq and Wagner 2015a], we described an algorithm to formalize the safety
requirements in LTL. Here, we extend it to include software safety requirements that include
timing. By using rules 3 and 4, each refined software safety requirement RSSRi, which is
identified from the refined unsafe control action RUCAi, can be transformed automatically
into a formal specification in LTL.
Rule 3 defines three types of software safety requirements, which means that the control
action CAi must not be provided in the type of context TC = any time, too early
or too late when the critical combination Csi of the relevant process model variable
values occurred. Each type of software safety can be transformed automatically into formal
specification by the following rules:
Rule 3.1: Each RSSRi derived from the context of providing control action CAi any
time can be automatically transformed into LTL as:
LTLi = G (Csi -> ! (controlAction == CAi)), where Csi=
⋃
(P1 = v1 ∧ . . .Pn = vn).
Rule 3.1 means that it always (G) the software controller should not (!) provide a control
action CAi when the values of the critical combination Csi have been occurred.
Rule 3.2: Each RSSRi derived from the context of providing control action CAi too
early can be automatically transformed into LTL as:
LTLi = G (((controlAction == CAi) -> Csi ) & ! ( (controlAction == CAi) U Csi)).
Rule 3.2 means that a software controller should always (G) not provide control action
CAi before the occurrence of critical combinations set Csi still not become true in the
execution path.
Rule 3.3: Each RSSRi derived from the context of providing control action CAi too
late can be automatically transformed into LTL as:
LTLi = G ((Csi-> (controlAction == CAi) ) & ! ( Csi U (controlAction == CAi)) ).
Rule 3.3 means that the software controller should always (G) not provide a control
action CAi while the occurrences of the critical set of combinations has become previously
true in the execution path.
Rule 4 defines one type of the software safety requirements which is the context of not
providing a control action CAi when it is required. This type can be expressed into LTL
by the following rule:
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Fig. 3. A safe software behavioural model
Rule 4.1: Each RSSRi derived from the context of Not providing of control action
CAi can be automatically transformed into LTL as:
LTLi = G (Csi -> (controlAction == CAi)), where Csi=
⋃
(P1 = v1 ∧ . . .Pn = vn).
This rule means that the occurrence of a critical set of combination values always implies
that the software controller must provide the control action CAi.
4.3. Constructing a Safe Software Behavioural Model
To generate the safety-based test cases, the information derived from the STPA safety
analysis must be integrated into a suitable model which should visualize the process model
variables of each software controller and their relations in a control structure diagram. For
this purpose, we select the stateflow [MathWorks 2016] diagram notations to visualize the
automation model of each software controller. The stateflow diagram is a visual notation
for describing dynamic behaviour, including the hierarchy, concurrency and communication
information. The idea here is to build a model from STPA results with a modeling editor
(e.g. Simulink) that supports the export of the statechart notations as XML specifications.
Definition 4.2 (Safe Behavioural Model (SBM)).
Let SBM be a Safe Behavioural Model (shown in Fig.3) which can be expressed by a
three-tuple (PMV , T , CA), where PMV is a set or subset of software controller states
S (process model variables), T is a set of transitions which are extracted from the refined
software safety requirements RSSR, and CA is the set of the critical software control
actions.
Each transition Ti of the safe behavioural model is expressed with the syntax Ti = IE
[SSR] / TA, where IE is the input event that causes the transition Ti, SSR is a safety
requirement which is a Boolean condition that constrain the transformation from the cur-
rent state to the next state, and TA is an action that will be executed when the Boolean
expression is valid. Each state in the stateflow model has three optional types of actions:
Entry, During and Exist actions. Entry actions execute when the state is entered, During
actions execute when the state is active, an event occurs and no valid transition to another
state is available, and Exit actions execute when the state is active and a transition out of
the state occurs [MathWorks 2016]. These actions are used to determine how to change the
current state of the software controller to the next state.
We identify the rules of constructing a safe software behavioural model from the STPA
results as follows:
— The safe behavioural model should contain all internal state process variables of the
software controller in the STPA control structure diagram: PMV ⊂ S ∈ SBM , where S
is a set of software controller states.
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— All process model variables of the software controller in the STPA control structure
diagram should be declared in the safe behavioural model.
— The safe behavioural model should constrain the transitions using the STPA software
safety requirements (constraints) which are identified based on the rules 3 and 4.
— Define an enumeration data type variable named controlAction in the safe behavioural
model which takes all control actions of the software controller in the STPA control
structure diagram as its value.
— The controlAction variable will be used as an entry action of internal states of the safe be-
havioural model to show which control action will be issued when the software controller
enters a state.
4.4. Automatically Transforming a Safe Software Behavioural Model into an SMV Model
To check the correctness of the safe behavioural model and ensure that the safe behavioural
model of the software controller satisfies all STPA software safety requirements, the safe
behavioural model must be verified against the generated LTL formulae. For this purpose,
we developed an algorithm that automatically transforms the SBM model created in the
Simulink editor into an input language of a model checker such as SMV (Symbolic Model
Verifier), automatically parses the LTL formulae from the STPA data model and includes
them into an SMV model. To verify the SMV model against the STPA software safety
requirements, we use the NuSMV model checker. In case that the SMV model does not
satisfy a given LTL of a software safety requirement, the NuSMV model checker will produce
a counterexample that contains the information where the model violates the given LTL.
Based on the counterexample’s information, the safe behavioural model diagram should be
modified and transformed again into an SMV model until it satisfies all STPA-generated
software safety requirements.
The algorithm of generating the SMV model is divided into three sub-algorithms: 1)
generate STPA data model which parses XML specifications of the STPA project created
in XSTAMPP into the corresponding Java objects that represent all STPA data (shown in
algorithm 1); 2) generate stateflow (safe behavioural model) data model which parses XML
specifications of a stateflow model into the Java objects that represent all stateflow data
and generate a Tree of Stateflow states (TSf) in which a node represents one stateflow
state (shown in algorithm 2); and 3) generate SMV model which transforms the STPA
data model and stateflow data model into SMV specifications (shown in algorithm 3).
Algorithm 1 shows the process of parsing the STPA project created by XSTAMPP. To
parse the XML specifications of the STPA project into Java objects, we use Java Architec-
ture for XML Binding (JAXB) [Ort and Mehta 2003] technology. The algorithm process
accepts the STPA project file P with extensions .hazx or .haz as input. Then, it parses the
XML specification of the STPA project into the corresponding Java objects which represent
all data in an STPA project. For each software controller in the control structure diagram,
a Java Data Model object DM will be created to store the information about the software
controller such as its critical control actions, process model and its variables, software safety
requirements and the generated LTL formulae.
Algorithm 2 shows how to parse the XML specifications of the stateflow model stored
in a Simulink/Matlab file. The input of this algorithm is an XML file of the Simulink
stateflow file (Sf) which contains XML specifications of the stateflow model. To parse
the stateflow file which we created in the Simulink editor with the extension .slx, we first
generate XML specifications of the Simulink stateflow from the Simulink/Matlab editor by
using the Matlab command:
save system ( ’ S ta t e f l ow . s lx ’ , ’ Output . xml ’ , ’ExportToXML ’ , t rue )
The structure of the stateflow model allows a multilevel hierarchy of states in which
a state Si.j can contain sub-states with different types, where i inducts the number of
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ALGORITHM 1: Generate STPA Data Model
Input: P : A STPA file with extension .haz or hazx
Data: DM= A Java data model to store STPA results, CAs= a list of control actions, PMV = a
list of process model variables and their values, SSR = a list of software safety requirements,
and LTLs = a list of generated LTL formulae of SSR.
Output: DCs= a list of the data model of controllers CO ∈ P.
Description:
1: Parse XML specifications of STPA project P into DM Java objects that represent all STPA
data.
2: Extract all data: DM ← P
3: for each SW Controller in DM do
4: Extract: CAs ← CAi,
PMV s ← PMV i,
SSRs ← SSRi,
LTLs← LTLi
5: Add DC i ← CAs, PMV s, LTLs, and SSRs.
6: Add DCs ← DC i.
7: end for
8: Return DCs
ALGORITHM 2: Generate a Tree of Stateflow Data
Input: Sf : A Simulink stateflow file with the extension .xml
Data: DM Sf = A Java data model to store all data of Stateflow in Sf , S= A list of states of
stateflow Sf .
Output: TSf= a tree which represents all information of stateflow states ∈ sf .
Description:
1: Parse XML specifications of Sf into DM Sf Java objects that represent all data of the
Simulink stateflow model.
2: Extract all data: DM Sf ← Sf
3: Extract all states at level 0:
S ← DM Sf .Stateflow.getStates().
4: Create a state root node ← root
5: Set ParentID root ← ParentID /∈ DM Sf .States.IDs,
Name root ← ’root’
6: for each State s in S do
7: Create a state child node ←node
8: Set ParentID node.parentID ← root.ID.
9: Set Data node.name ← s.name, node.Id ← s.SSID,
node.setDecomposition ← s.getDecomposition()
10: if s.hasChildren()==true then
11: node.isHasChildren(true)
12: traverseChildren (node , s )
13: end if
14: Add root.addChild ( node )
15: end for
// Extract all transitions between the states.
16: TSf .setTransitions(DM Sf .getTransitions())
// Extract all variables of stateflow.
17: TSf .setVariables(DM Sf .getV ariables())
TSf .root = root
18: Return TSf .
the level hierarchy of the stateflow model (i = 0...n), j is the number of states, and n
is the total number of levels in the stateflow model. Therefore, the process of algorithm
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ALGORITHM 3: traverseChildren(root, s)
Input: root : a root node in the tree TSf ,
s: a state in a satateflow data model DM Sf
Description:
1: if s.hasChildren()==ture then
2: for each State child in s.getChildren() do
3: Create a new node node
4: Set node.setName ← child.getName,
nodel.setId ← child.getID,
node.setParentID ← child.getParentID
5: if child.hasChildren()== ture then
6: node.setHasChildren (true)
7: end if
8: Add root.addChild(node)
9: traverseChildren(node, child)
10: end for
11: end if
2 traverses recursively the stateflow data model object based on the depth-first search
algorithm to consider all sub-states of the superstate and add them to the tree of stateflow.
Each stateflow model has two kinds of state decomposition: OR states (exclusive) and AND
(parallel) states [MathWorks 2016]. The stateflow semantics allow every state to has a
state decomposition that indicates what type of sub-states the superstate can contain. All
sub-states of a super-state Si.j should have the same type of decomposition of the parent
state.
The algorithm for generating the tree of the stateflow (shown in algorithms 2 & 3) starts
by parsing the XML specifications of the Simulink’s stateflow Sf into the Java data model
DM Sf . The Java data model DM Sf contains several Java classes as XML elements which
have similar attributes of the XML elements in Sf . A tree stateflow object will be cre-
ated to store a root node, a list of transitions and the list of the stateflow variables. As a
stateflow model has no root state, a default node called root will be created to store all
information about the super-states at level 0 and assigned its ParentID randomly as an
integer number that is not assigned to any state in the stateflow model. Each node stores
the following data: id, name, parentID, T a list of transitions, a list of children (sub-states),
the order of execution, a list of the state actions (entry, during and exit actions) and type
of decomposition state (OR State or AND State). All superstates at level 0 in the stateflow
model are added as the children of the default root node. For each state Si,j , a node will be
created to store all information of the state Si,j . If the state Si,j has children, then all its
substates will be traversed recursively until no more children exist for the superstate. Then,
a state node will be added as a child of the root node. The transitions at this level will be
added to a transition list of the stateflow tree TSf to be used in the next algorithms: the
SMVGenerator algorithm, Extended Finite State Machine model (EFSMGenerator) and a
truth-table of the EFSM model generator.
Figure 4 shows the basic structure of the SMV model as described in [Cavada et al. 2010].
Each SMV module represents a super state in the stateflow model which can contain the
following sections: 1) The name of the model with the optional state variable parameters,
2) The declaration of the state variable and their possible values, 3) The initial values of
variables and the states variable, 4) The sub-modules of the super module deceleration, 5)
The transitions of the module, and a list of the LTL formulae. To represent the states of the
stateflow model (' internal state variables of each controller in STPA) in an SMV model,
we declare an enumeration variable called ”states” which contains the names of sub-states
of the super- state in the stateflow model.
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1 MODULE main (<module variables >)
2 VAR
3 variables : <range data type >/<enumeration >
4 <nameSub1 >: _SubModule1 (variables)
5 ...
6 <nameSubN >: _SubModuleN (variables)
7 states: <All children states >
8 ASSIGN
9 INIT (states=<initialState >)
10 INIT (<variable > =<value >)
11 next(<variable >):= case
12 <var1 >=<value > & <tranConditon >:<nextValue >;
13 ...
14 next(states):= case
15 <states >= value & transition:nextState;
16 ...
17 esac;
18 LTLSPEC
19 <List of LTL formulae >
Fig. 4. The structure of the SMV model is generated from the stateflow tree and the STPA data object
Based on the principles of the SMV model [Cavada et al. 2010] and stateflow diagram
[MathWorks 2016], we develop an algorithm to transform the stateflow (safe behavioural
model) and STPA data objects into an SMV model. Algorithm 4 shows the process of
automatically transforming the safe behavioural model and the STPA data model into an
input language of the SMV model checker. The algorithm traverses the states of the safe
behavioural model recursively and generates the SMV model by parsing the hierarchical
levels of the safe behavioural model. The inputs of the algorithm are a tree of stateflow
model TSf which is created based on algorithm 2 and the STPA data model DCsi of the
software controller CO i, which is generated based on algorithm 1 and a node n in the tree
TSf .
The algorithm process starts by creating an object of the SMV model which is a Java
class representing all structure data of the SMV model. The algorithm takes the root node
of the safe behavioural model tree as the input at the first time to create the main module
of the SMV model, then it declares the variables and maps their data types to the SMV
data types. Secondly, the algorithm checks whether the root state root has children states
and which of them has children too. In case that a child node of root has children, then the
algorithm declares a sub-module for this child node as follows: name: sub Module (variables
as parameters);
Then, the algorithm takes all variables of the current state node to create a list of the
parameters of the sub- module. Next, the algorithm parses the sub-states of the super-state
and creates the variable ”states” with a list of the names of the substates as values. Then,
the algorithm parses all local variables of the state as they are declared in the stateflow
model. The SMV model does not support the same basic data types (int, double, single) as
the data types which are declared in the stateflow model, it supports only a finite range type
as integer range min...max value. Therefore, the algorithm should map the data types (int,
double or single) into a finite range which starts with 0 and ends with a maximum value of
integer data type. The enumeration data types are declared into the stateflow model as a
class which is saved in a separate file and not in the XML specifications of stateflow model.
Therefore, the algorithm checks each variable with enumeration data type whether it is a
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process model variable in the STPA data model or not. In case the enumeration variable
is a process model variable, the algorithm takes its values as they are defined in the STPA
process model variable values. Otherwise, the algorithm creates an empty bracket {} for
the values of the enumeration variable and prompts the user to determine the values of this
variable. The algorithm will check whether the variables are declared exactly in the process
model of the software controller in the STPA control structure diagram to reduce the time
and effort of matching these variables during the verification step.
The algorithm will create the initial expression of the ”states” variable. Each data variable
will also be initialised with the minimum value of its data type (a variable with a numeric
data type with zero, Boolean with FALSE and enumeration variable with the first value).
Next, the algorithm will parse all transitions of the current state node and create the next
expressions for the ”states” variable. The next expressions of states variable refer to the
transition relations of current state node with other states in the model (the truthtable).
The next expressions of the states variable are expressed as follows:
next ( s t a t e s ):= case
s t a t e s=<substate> & t r a n s i t i o n : <nexts tate>
. . .
1 : {Al l sub−s t a t e s }
esac ;
To create the next expressions for each data variable, the algorithm parses the entry,
during and exit actions of the current state and extracts all actions of each variable. The
next expressions of the data variables refer to the values of variables in the next state. The
next expressions of each data variable are expressed as follows:
next ( v a r i a b l e ):= case
s t a t e s = <s ta te> & t r a n s i t i o n : <nextValue>
. . . .
The algorithm will continue parsing the super-state in the tree of the safe behavioural
model (stateflow) till all super-states have been visited. The generated SMV specifications
of each sub-module and the main module will be saved as a string into a stack object.
Finally, the algorithm will fetch the LTL formulae from the STPA data model object and
add them at the end of the main-module section. To create the text file of the SMV model
with extension *.smv, the algorithm will read SMV data from a stack object and save it to
a file.
To check the correctness of the generated SMV model and the safe behavioural model,
we run the NuSMV model checker to verify the whether the SMV model contains errors
and verify it against the STPA software safety requirements expressed in the LTL formulae
and saved to the SMV model.
4.5. Automatically Constructing the Safe Test Model from the Safe Software Behavioural Model
To generate test cases for a system, the system behaviour should be modelled into a suitable
model such as an extended finite state machine model. The Extended Finite State Machine
(EFSM) [Harel 1987] is a common and very useful diagram to model the system behaviour
and suitable for driving the test cases. EFSM contains nodes which represent the states of
the system and the directed arcs which represent the transitions of the system from one
state to another [Utting and Legeard 2007].
In [Harel 1987] Harel defined the statecharts language and the semantics of statecharts
for complex systems. Simply, each stateflow has a chart which is an independent state
machine. Each chart has one or more states which are linked together by arcs labeled with
transition information. The states can be also hierarchical states and contains a number
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ALGORITHM 4: generateSMV(TSf , DCsi, n)
Input: TSf : a tree data model of safe behavioural model,
DCsi: a STPA data model of controller Ci, n: is a node in tree TSf .
Output: SMV i: a SMVJava class represents the data of SMV.
Description:
1: Create a SMV i ← SMV model object
2: if (n.isRoot ()==true) then
3: Set header of SMV i ← ’Module main’
4: else
5: SMV i← ’Module’ root.getName() (root.getVariables)
6: end if
7: Set VAR section of SMV i ← ’VAR’
8: Parse SMV i.setV ariables() ← TSf .getV ariables()
9: Map data type of SMV variables into SMV data types.
10: if (checkInSTPA (n.getV araibles(), DCsi) then
11: Declare each variable as v.getName : var.getType();
12: if (n.isSubModule==true) then
13: for each s ∈ n.getChildren() do
14: Declare ”Sub ” + s.getName(n.getV ariables())
15: end for
16: end if
17: initial each v of SMV i.InitialVariables ←
18: init(v.getName()) :=initial Value;
19: Set ASSIGN section of SMV i← ’Assign’
20: Parse Transitions T ← n.getTransitions()
21: Set Next section of T of n state
22: SMV i.← ’next’ (states) := case
23: for each t ∈ T do
24: states := t.Source&t.Condition : t.Destination;
25: TRUE : states; esac;
26: end for
27: if (n.isRoot ()==true) then
28: for each v ∈ n.getVariables do
29: SMV i.← ’next’ (v.getName) := case
30: states=n.getSource(): n.getEntry(v.getName)
31: TRUE: v.getName; esac;
32: end for
33: end if
34: SMV i ← ’esac;’
35: if (n.hasChildren()) then
36: for s ∈ root.getChildren() do
37: SMV i ← generateSMV(TSf , DCsi, s)
38: end for
39: end if
40: else
41: Show ”STPA variables do not match Sf variables”
42: SMV i ← null
43: end if
44: SMV i← ”LTLSPEC ”DCsi.getLTL()
45: Return SMV i.
of sub-states (children). Each state should have a type of state decomposition OR STATE
or AND STATE. The OR STATE decomposition allows only one substate (which has a
default transition) to be active, at a time when the parent (superstate) is active whereas the
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AND STATE decomposition allows all sub-states to be active when the parent (superstate)
is active.
After ensuring the correctness of the generated SMV model of the safe behavioural model
(stateflow model), the safe behavioural model which uses the notations of the Simulink’s
stateflow should be transformed into the EFSM notation. For this purpose, we develop an
algorithm based on the semantics of the stateflow and EFSM to map the stateflow tree of
the safe behavioural model and its truth-table into an EFSM model. The algorithms 5 and
6 show the process of transforming the tree of the stateflow model into a EFSM model. The
idea here is to eliminate the hierarchical and concurrent structure of the stateflow model
(flattened and broadcast communication) and transform them into the EFSM notations by
considering the state decomposition (exclusive or parallel).
The algorithm 5 starts by taking the root node of the stateflow tree TSf as the root
node of the EFSM model and the truth table of the stateflow as the truth table of the
EFSM model. The stateflow semantic supports multi-hierarchy levels of states, whereas the
EFSM model does not. Therefore, the truth table of the EFSM model must not have any
source or destination node as a super-state (a state that has children). The idea here is to
investigate the truth table of stateflow and update the destination and source parent state
with its substates. At the beginning, the algorithm checks whether there is a super-state in
the truth table. For each transition t ∈ T in the truth table, the algorithm will identify its
a source state and a destination state and check their decompositions as follows:
— If source state src ∈ Tsf of transition t is a super-state with a state decomposition
”OR STATE” or ”AND STATE” and the destination node dest ∈ Tsf is not super-
state. Each sub-state of src state must be linked to the destination state dest by creating
a new transition with the same information of transition T ∈ Tsf .T ruthTable for each
substate and only update the source with substate.
— If source state src ∈ Tsf is not super-state and the destination state dest ∈ Tsf is
super-state with a state decomposition ”OR STATE”. The default state defaultState
of super-state dest (a default state is a state which has a default transition) should be
identified. A new transition will be created and set its source as src and its destination
as the default state of destination.
— If source state src ∈ Tsf is not super-state and the destination state dest ∈ Tsf is
super-state with a state decomposition ”AND STATE”. All sub-states of dest state
should be identified and linked with the source state. A new transition will be created for
each substate of dest, where source is src and destination is the substate of destination.
— If source state src ∈ Tsf is super-state with a state decomposition ”OR STATE” or
”AND STATE” and the destination state dest ∈ Tsf is super-state with a state decom-
position ”OR STATE”. All sub-states of src state should be identified and linked with a
default state of dest state. A new transition will be created for each substate of src and
its source is src and its destination is the default state of destination dest state.
— If source state src ∈ Tsf is super-state with a state decomposition ”OR STATE” or
”AND STATE” and the destination state dest ∈ Tsf is super-state with a state decom-
position ”AND STATE”. All sub-states of src state should be identified and linked with
all sub-states of dest state. A new transition will be created for each substate of src and
its source is src and its destination is the sub-state of destination dest state.
— If source state src ∈ Tsf is not super-state and the destination state dest ∈ Tsf is not
super-state. A transition t will be added into the truthtable.
The algorithm runs continuously till no superstate in the truth-table. All substates (without
children) in the stateflow model tree will be taken as the states of the EFSM model. Also,
all data variables of the stateflow model and the actions of the state (entry, exist, during)
will be taken added into the states of EFSM. Please note that in this algorithm we did not
consider the semantic of join transitions which are allowed in the stateflow semantics.
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ALGORITHM 5: GenerateEFSM(TSf )
Input: TSf : a tree of stateflow model,
Output: EFSM : a Java object represent all data of EFSM
Description:
1: Create StateNode root ← TSf .getRoot()
2: Get TruthTable truthTable ← TSf .getTruthTable()
3: if root.hasChildren()==ture then
4: Set Initial state ← TSf .getInitialState( )
5: while isHasSuperState(truthTable) do
6: for Transition t ∈ truthTable do
7: StateNode src ← t.getSourceNode ()
8: StateNode dest ← t.getDestinationNode ()
9: if src.isSuper() & !(dest.isSuper()) then
10: get children ← src.getChildren()
11: for child ∈ children do
12: updateTruthTable (child, dest, t, truthTable)
13: end for
14: else
15: if !(src.isSuper()) & dest.isSuper() then
16: get children ← dest.getSubSates();
17: for child ∈ children do
18: updateTruthTable (src, child, t, truthTable)
19: end for
20: end if
21: else
22: if src.isSuper() & dest.isSuper() & OR STATE then
23: get srcChildren ← src.getSubSates();
24: get def ← dest.getDefaultSate();
25: for s ∈ srcchildren do
26: updateTruthTable (s, def, t, truthTable)
27: end for
28: end if
29: else
30: if src.isSuper() & dest.isSuper() & AND STATE then
31: get srcChildren ← src.getSubSates();
32: get destChildren ← dest.getSubSates();
33: for s ∈ srcchildren do
34: for d ∈ destchildren do
35: updateTruthTable (s, d, t, truthTable)
36: end for
37: end for
38: else
39: if !(src.isSuper())& !(dest.isSuper()) then
40: updateTruthTable (src, dest, t, truthTable)
41: end if
42: end if
43: end if
44: end for
45: end while
46: end if
47: Add EFSM .setTruthTable ← truthTable
48: Add EFSM .setStates ← TSf .getStates()
49: Return EFSM .
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ALGORITHM 6: UpdateTruthTable(src, dest, t, truthTable)
Input: src : a source node of transition t, dest: a destination node of transition t, t : a transition
in the truth table, truthTable: a truthTable of stateflow tree Tsf
Description:
1: create new Transition t new
2: set data t new ← t
3: update t new.setSrc(src)
4: update t new.setDest(dest)
5: add truthTable ← t new
4.6. Automatically Generating Safety-Based Test Cases
The final step is to generate the test cases from the safe test model which are constructed
from the safe behavioural model.
Kim et al. [Kim et al. 1999] describe how to generate test cases from Unified Modelling
Language (UML) statechart diagrams. Based on this work, we develop an algorithm to
derive the test cases from the EFSM with depth-first search and breadth-first search mech-
anism. The test data input of the test case generation algorithm are extracted from the
stateflow model (all variables with input scope). For each input test variable, the algorithm
prompts the user to identify the initial, minimum and maximum values.
Generating test cases from a model usually leads to an infinite number of possible test
cases. Therefore, it is necessary to choose a suitable test coverage criteria to manage the
generating process. In our algorithm, we identify three test coverage criteria: 1) state cov-
erage which is the number of visited states divided by the total number of the states of
the model, 2) transition coverage is the number of the executed transitions divided by the
total number of the transitions, 3) STPA safety requirements coverage in which each STPA
software safety requirement should be covered at least in one test case to trace how the
STPA-generated software safety requirements are covered into the generated test cases.
To measure the STPA SSR coverage , we define a safety requirements traceability matrix
between the generated safe test model and STPA software safety requirements to manage
the quality of the test case generating process and measure the coverage of STPA software
safety requirements in the generated safety-based test cases. As the safe test model of the
safe behavioural model is constrained with STPA safety requirements (step 2) and con-
tains the process model variables as states, the algorithm will automatically generate the
traceability matrix (TM= SSR × tn, where SSR ∈ DCs of the STPA data model and TN
transition conditions ∈ TSf ).
Algorithm 7 takes the generated Safe Test Model (STM ), a Traceability Matrix TM , a
list of the test coverage criteria CC , a number of Test steps which is the total number of
executions of the algorithm and a stop condition which is a test coverage criteria to stop
the execution of the algorithm when it reaches 100%. The process of generating the test
cases from the safe test model can be described as follows:
(1) The algorithm starts by selecting a random state as the start state and a state as the
end state from the safe test model to generate all possible paths between them.
(2) A new test suite ts will be created to store all the generated test cases.
(3) Generate for each input data variable a random value between its minimum and maxi-
mum values which are identified by the user.
(4) By using the depth-first algorithm, all possible paths between the start and end states
will be identified. The path here means a sequence of the visited states and their transi-
tions. We also use the breadth-depth-first algorithm combined with depth first algorithm
to identify all possible paths PT from start state to achieve a good test coverage criteria.
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— For each transition t in path pt ∈ PT , its transition condition will be transformed
into a Java Script function. The test input variables in will be passed as an input
of a Java Script function. To execute this function at the run time, we use the Java
Script Engine which invokes the function with values of input data parameters and
returns the result.
— For each state s in path pt, the state actions (Entry, During, Exit) will be eliminated
and transformed into Java Script functions. These will be executed to update the
values of each local loc or output variable out of each state.
— Create a new test case tc. Each test case will store the information about the sequence
path pt such as: id is a number of the test case, id Ts which is the number of the test
suite, id SSR which is the number of the software safety requirement, preconditions
and actions which is the sequence of the local variables of states in the path pt and
their updated values, and postconditions which is thesequence of output variables
and their values.
(5) Check whether the test case tc has been covered in any test suite. If it hasn’t, tc will
be added to the test suite ts.
(6) Calculate the test coverage criteria and check the stop condition of the algorithm.
(7) Change status of all states and transitions in the safe test model to unvisited to generate
a new sequence path.
(8) The algorithm will be continued (repeat1-8) till the stop condition is achieved (100%)
or the number of executions the algorithm has been reached to the total number of the
test steps.
Ultimately, the time spent during test case generation process, the values of the test
coverage criteria and a list of test suits and their test cases with the related software safety
requirements will be automatically saved into a CSV file.
5. TOOL SUPPORT
Fig. 5. STPA test case generator tool
Here we describe the implementation of the proposed approach for generating test cases
based on the information derived from the STPA safety analysis. We use the previous
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ALGORITHM 7: Generate Safety-based Test Cases(STM , TM ,CC, TestSteps, StopConiditon)
Input: STM : a safe test model extracted from SBM , TM : a traceability matrix, CC: is a list of
the test coverage criteria, TestSteps is the total number of execution algorithms,
StopCondition: a condition to stop the execution process.
Output TS: a list of test suites, each test suite should contain a list one test case TC.
Description:
1: Initial step ← 0
2: while step < TestSteps do
3: Choose start state ← STM.getRandomState()
4: Choose end state ← STM.getRandomState()
5: Create a new test suite ts
6: if StopConiditon < 100.0% then
7: Randomly Generate Tes InputData ()
8: Walk TC i ← GenerateTestCasesByDFS (start, end)
9: Add ts ← TC i
10: Walk TC j ← GenerateTestCasesByBFS (start)
11: Add ts ← TC j
12: else
13: if StopConiditon==100.0% then
14: Calculate Coverage Criteria()
15: STOP
16: end if
17: end if
18: ADD TS ← ts
19: Calculate Coverage Criteria()
20: unvisitedTransitions(STM)
21: unvisitedStates(STM)
22: Initial step ← step + 1
23: end while
24: Return TS.
algorithms and rules as the basis for implementing tool support for our safety-based test
case generation approach.
To automatically formalize the STPA software safety requirements which are documented
in XSTAMPP and transformed into LTL based on rules 1–4, we developed an Eclipse plug-in
called XSTPA2 based on the XSTAMPP architecture. XSTPA automatically generates the
context tables (combinations between process model variables) by using a Java library for
the combinatorial testing algorithm called ACTS3 [Kuhn et al. 2013] which was developed
by the American National Institute of Standards and Technology to generate combination
sets of t parameters with n values. Based on rules 3 and 4, XSTPA automatically generates
the LTL formulae. The generated LTL formulae will be used to check the correctness of the
constructed safe test model which will be used to generate the safety-based test cases for
each STPA-generated software safety requirement.
To generate the test cases based on STPA results, we implemented a tool support called
STPA Test Cases Generator (STPA TCGenerator4, shown in Fig.5) which parses the STPA
file project created in XSTAMPP and the safe behavourial model which is created with
Simulink’s stateflow editor to generate the SMV model and check the correctness of the
safe beahvioural model, eliminate the safe test model and generate safety-based test cases.
The STPA TCGenerator tool accepts two files as input: an STPA project with extension
2http://www.iste.uni-stuttgart.de/se/werkzeuge/xstpa.html
3http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/acts/index.html
4https://sourceforge.net/projects/stpastgenerator/
Preprint, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: October 2016.
An Automatic Safety-Based Test Case Generation Approach Based on Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis:21
Fig. 6. A mechanism of the simulator of ACC with Stop and Go function
haz. or .hazx and a stateflow model as xml file. The STPA TCGenerator parses the XML
specifications of the STPA project and stateflow model into the corresponding Java objects
by using Java Architecture for XML Binding (JAXB) [Ort and Mehta 2003] technology. We
implemented a Java library called SMV Generator which contains all necessary methods
for transforming the XML specifications of the STPA project and stateflow model into an
SMV model. To check the correctness of the generated model against the LTL formulae of
STPA software safety requirements, STPA TCGenerator uses the binary files of the NuSMV
model checker to verify the generated SMV model.
For generating and visualizing the safe behavioural tree and the safe based model, we
implemented a Java library called buildTestGraph which contains all the necessary methods
and functions to visualize the safe test model and its truth table. buildTestGraph uses
the Java library called JGraphT 5 to visualize the safe behavioural model tree Tsf . STPA
TCGenerator provides a test input data table which contains all input variables extracted
from the safeflow model of SBM to allow the user to assign the initial, maximum, and
minimum values for each variable.
To generate the test cases, STPA TCGenerator provides a test configuration view in which
the user has to assign the test steps, select the test coverage criteria (state, transitions, STPA
software safety requirements), and the test algorithm (depth-first search or breadth-depth-
first search or both), and select a test coverage criterion as a stop condition. The generated
test suites and the test cases will be viewed into a tree and saved automatically in an Excel
sheet. The first prototype of STPA TCGenerator and the results of the illustrative example
are available online in our repository6.
6. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: A SIMULATOR OF THE ACC SYSTEM WITH STOP
AND GO FUNCTION
To illustrate the proposed approach, we developed a simulator software written in ANSI-
C to simulate the adaptive cruise control system with stop and go function by using two
LEGO EV3 Mindstorm robots7. The simulator was developed by a bachelor student within
6 months. The ACC with stop and go function [Venhovens and Naab 2000] is an extended
version of the normal adaptive cruise control system. It maintains a certain speed and keeps
a safe distance from the vehicle ahead based on the radar sensors. The ACC with stop and
go function will bring the vehicle to a complete stop when the vehicle ahead comes to a
standstill or there is a stationary object in the lane.
Figure 6 shows the mechanism of the simulator of the ACC with stop and go. The ACC
simulator maintains a constant time gap to vehicles ahead. It uses a forward ultrasonic
sensor with a range of up to 255 centimeters, which is located in the front of the robot
5http://jgrapht.sourceforge.net
6https://sourceforge.net/projects/stpastgenerator/.
7http://www.iste.uni-stuttgart.de/en/se/forschung/werkzeuge/acc-simulator.html
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Table I. Examples of potentially unsafe control actions of the ACC software controller
Control
Action
Not providing
causes hazard
Providing causes
hazard
Wrong timing or
order causes haz-
ard
Stopped too soon
or Applied too
long
Accelerate
Speed
The ACC soft-
ware does not
accelerate the
speed when the
robot vehicle
ahead is so far in
the lane. [Not
Hazardous]
UCA-1.1: The ACC
software accelerates the
speed of robot unin-
tendedly when the time
gap to the robot vehicle
ahead is smaller than the
desired time gap. [H-1]
[H−2]
UCA-1.2: The
ACC software
accelerates the
speed before the
robot vehicle
ahead starts
to move again.
[H-1] [H-2]
UCA-1.3: The
ACC software
accelerates the
speed too long so
that it exceeds the
desired speed of
the robot. [H-2]
Decelerate
Speed
UCA-1.5: The
ACC software
does not decel-
erate the speed
when the robot
vehicle ahead is
too close in the
lane. [H-1]
The ACC software decel-
erates the speed of robot
unintendedly when the
time gap to the robot ve-
hicle ahead is larger than
desired time gap. [Not
Hazardous]
The ACC soft-
ware decelerates
the speed when
the robot ve-
hicle ahead
starts to move
again. [Not
Hazardous]
UCA-1.6: The
ACC software
decelerates the
speed long enough
so that it cannot
bring the robot to
fully stop when
the robot ahead is
stopped. [H-3]
FullyStop UCA-1.4: The
ACC software
does not bring
the robot to a
complete stop at
a standstill when
the robot vehicle
ahead is fully
stopped. [H-1,
H-3]
The ACC software stops
the robot suddenly when
the distance to the robot
ahead is too close. [Not
Hazardous]
The ACC soft-
ware does not
accelerate the
speed after
the robot ve-
hicle ahead
starts to move
again. [Not
Hazardous]
N/A
Fig. 7. The ACC system with a Stop and Go function scenarios
to detect the distance of the robot ahead of it and can automatically maintain the pre-set
time gap. It adjusts the robot speed by increasing or decreasing the value of current speed
to keep a safe distance. If the robot ahead is completely stopped, then the ACC simulator
will slow down the robot vehicle to a standstill. If the vehicle ahead starts moving again,
then the ACC simulator will automatically start to move again and maintain a constant
time gap between the robot ahead. Our simulator algorithm is the ACC simulator starts
first read the distance data from the ultrasonic sensor and then compute the time gap by
using the following equation:
currentT imegap = |Frontdistance
CurrentSpeed
| (1)
Second, the simulator computes the standstill time, which is the time at which the ACC
vehicle must decrease the speed or stop when the vehicle ahead is close or fully stopped. It
is calculated as
∆Timegap = stillstandtime +
√
currentT imegap (2)
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Third, the simulator will compare the value of the time gap with the following scenarios
(shown in Fig.7):
— TimeGap > (∆TimeGap + safeTimeGap). This indicates that the vehicle ahead is so
far from the point tσ. The simulator will accelerate the speed of the vehicle robot till the
desired speed. The simulator adjusts (increase/decrease) the current speed by using the
following equation:
currentSpeed + /− =
√
speed2 + 2 ∗ (Time), (3)
where Time = ((∆Timegap + safeTimeGap) - TimeGap)
— (TimeGap > safeTimeGap) && (timeGap < (∆TimeGap + safeTimeGap)). This indi-
cates that the vehicle robot ahead is approaching within the period of time gap between
[tσ tsafeT imeGap]. The simulator will put the ACC system in follow mode. Follow mode
means that there is a vehicle in front in the lane. The simulator will automatically adjust
the current speed by using the equation 3.
— TimeGap == safeTimeGap. This indicates that the vehicle robot ahead is approaching
within the desired time gap and there is a safety distance between them. The simulator
will put the ACC system in the cruise mode. Cruise mode means that the vehicle robot
ahead is approaching in safe time gap. Then, the simulator will set the current speed as
the desired speed.
— TimeGap < safeTimeGap. This indicates that the vehicle ahead is moving within the
time between [tsafeT imeGap t0]. The simulator will reduce the speed of the vehicle by
using the equation 3.
— TimeGap == 0. This indicates that the vehicle ahead has fully stopped. Then the sim-
ulator will bring the vehicle to a complete stop at the standstill distance and change
the ACC mode to stop. If the front vehicle starts to move again, then the simulator will
change the ACC mode to resume. Resume mode means that the current speed of the
ACC vehicle will be accelerated to the desired speed. The simulator uses the following
equation to achieve that:
currentSpeed+ = accelerationratio, (4)
where the accelerationratio is set to 4 cm/sec;
6.1. Deriving Software Safety Requirements of the ACC Simulator
To derive the software safety requirements, we applied the STPA SwISs Step 1 to the system
specification requirements. We used the XSTAMPP software tool to document the results
of STPA and generate the formal specification of the STPA results. The results are saved
in a STPA project file called ACCSimulator.hazx.
As a result, we identified the system-level accidents that the simulator software can lead
(or contribute to ). For example, ACC-1 : The ACC robot crashes the robot ahead.
The system-level hazards which can lead to this accident are:
—H1: The ACC software does not keep a safe distance from the a vehicle robot ahead.
—H2: The ACC software provides an unintended acceleration when the vehicle in front is
too close.
—H3: The ACC software does not stop the vehicle when the vehicle ahead is fully stopped.
We built the control structure diagram of the ACC simulator (shown in Fig. 8). It contains
the main interconnecting components of the ACC simulator at a high level, such as the ACC
simulator software controller unit, the electronic motors, the robot vehicle as the controlled
process, and the Ultrasonic and speed sensors. The ACC software controller receives the
distance data from the ultrasonic sensor and current speed data from the speed sensor.
Based on this information, the software will calculate the time gap and determine if the
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Fig. 8. The control structure diagram of ACC with the safety-critical process model variables
Fig. 9. The safe behavioural model of the ACC software controller
vehicle robot ahead is present. The ACC software will adjust the speed of the robot based on
the above sensors and issues one of the critical safety control action: accelerate, decelerate,
or fullystop. Each one of these control actions will be evaluated based on the four general
hazardous types (columns of table I). Table I shows the examples of the potential unsafe
control actions of the ACC simulator.
Preprint, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: October 2016.
An Automatic Safety-Based Test Case Generation Approach Based on Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis:25
Table II. Examples of software safety requirements at the system level
Related UCAs Corresponding Safety Constraints
UCA-1.1 SSR1.1- ACC software should not accelerate the speed of the robot when the target
robot vehicle is too close in the lane.
UCA-1.2 SSR1.2- ACC software should not accelerate the speed when the robot ahead is fully
stopped.
UCA-1.3 SSR1.3-ACC software should not increase the speed than the desired speed.
UCA-1.4 SSR1.4-ACC controller should stop the robot at standstill point (shown in Fig. 7) when
the robot ahead is fully stopped.
Table III. Examples of the context table of providing the control action accelerate
Control
Ac-
tions
Process Model Variables Is it a hazardous
Control Action?
CurrentSpeed TimeGap ACC Mode providing
accelerate
CS> minSpeed TimeGap <( ∆ Timegap +
safetyTimeGap)
follow No
CS<=desiredSpeed TimeGap == 0 follow Yes, H2, H1
CS<desiredSpeed TimeGap >safetyTimeGap follow No
CS<desiredSpeed TimeGap < (∆ TimeGap +
safetyTimeGap)
follow Yes
Table IV. Examples of refined software safety requirements in XSTAMPP based on critical combinations
Related UCAs Refined Safety Constraints
RUCA-1.1 RSSR1.1- Accelerate command must not be provided when ACC mode is Standby and
timeGap is greater than (deltaX + safetyTimeGap) and the current speed is less than
desired speed.
RUCA-1.2 RSSR1.2- Accelerate command must not be provided when timeGap is less than (deltaX
+TimeGap).
RUCA-1.3 RSSR1.3-Accelerate command must not be provided when current speed is greater than
or equal to desired speed.
RUCA-1.4 RSSR1.4-FullyStop command must provided when the timeGap is 0.
RUCA2.1 RSSR2.1- Decelerate command must not be provided too late when ACC mode is follow
and timeGap is less than safetyTimeGap and currentSpeed is greater than desired speed.
We evaluated each item in table I to check whether it can contribute or lead to any system-
level hazards (H1− H3). If an item is hazardous, then we assign one or more system-level
hazards to it. We translate each hazardous item manually to the corresponding software
safety requirement by using the guide words, e.g., have to, must be, or should. Table II
shows examples of the informal textual software safety requirements.
To refine the informal textual software safety requirements which are shown in table II, we
identified the process model of the ACC software controller and its critical variables which
have an effect on the safety of the ACC software control actions. Figure 8 shows the control
structure diagram and process model variables of the ACC software. The ACC software
has three safety-critical process model variables: Internal variables such as currentSpeed
(5 values), Timegap (5 values), Internal states variable such as ACC mode (states) with 5
values, and the environmental variables such as front distance. Each safety control action
provided by the ACC software should be evaluated to determine whether it will be hazardous
or not when the combination set of relevant values of the process model variables (context)
occur.
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Table V. Examples of LTL formulae of the refined software safety requirements at the system level
Refined SSRs Corresponding LTL formula
RSSR1.1 LTL1.1- [] ((state=Standby) && (timeGap > deltaX+safetyTimeGap) &&
(currenSpeed<desiredSpeed) -> ! (controlAction==Accelerate)).
RSSR1.2 LTL1.2- []((currentSpeed > desiredSpeed ) && (TimeGap <(deltaTime + safety-
TimeGap)) − >! (controlAction==Accelerate).
RSSR-1.3 LTL1.3-[]((currentSpeed >=desiredSpeed) − >! (ControlAction==stop) .
RSSR-1.4 LTL1.4- []((timeGap == 0 ) − > (controlAction==FullyStop).
RUCA2.1 LTL.2.1- [] ((state==Follow) && (timeGap <safetyTimeGap) && (currentSpeed
>= desiredSpeed) − > !(controlAction==Decelerate))
We used XSTPA to generate the critical combinations (context tables) for each safety-
critical action in the two contexts when the control action is provided and it is not provided
and causes hazard. For each control action, the total number of combinations between the
process model variables is (5 × 5 × 5 =125) combinations. We reduced the number of
combinations by applying pairwise test coverage to the generated combination sets. The
number of critical combinations is reduced to 25 for each control action.
Based on the generated combination sets, we evaluated each control action in two contexts
Providing and Not Providing. Table III shows examples of the context table of providing
the control action accelerate based on the combinations of the values of the critical process
model variables. As a result, we identified 32 unsafe scenarios for all the control actions
accelerate (18 scenarios), decelerate (7 scenarios ) and FullyStop (7 scenarios).
From the critical combinations of each control action, we used XSTAMPP to automati-
cally refine the informal textual software safety requirements into formal textual software
safety requirements (shown in Table IV). Based on the rules 3-4, XSTAMPP also automati-
cally generates the LTL formula for each refined software safety requirement. Table V shows
the examples of the corresponding LTL formula of each software safety requirement. We
used the generated-LTL formulae to verify the safe behavioural model which is constructed
from the STPA results.
6.2. Automatically Generating SMV Model
We created a Simulink/Matlab stateflow model to visualize a safe behavioural model of
the ACC simulator (shown in Fig. 9). The safe behavioural model is saved in a Simulink
file called ACCSimulator.slx. It contains 10 states (2 of them are decomposition with
AND STATE) and 20 transitions. It shows the relationship between the process model
variables in the safety control structure diagram which describes the critical states of the
software and how the software issues the critical safety control actions( e.g. accelerate,
decelerate, etc.)
To validate the correctness of the safe behavioural model, we generated a verification
input of the NuSVM model checker. For that, we first derived the XML specifications of
ACCSimulator.slx Simulink’s stateflow file. The XML specifications are saved in an XML
file called ACCSimulator.xml. Second, we took the STPA project file ACCSimulator.hazx
and ACCSimulator.xml as input to the tool STPA TCGenerator. The tool parses both files
and generates the SMV model which maps all states, transitions and data variables, and
LTL formulae of STPA software safety requirements of the safe behavioural model to SMV
model specifications and automatically saved them into a file named as ACCSimulator.smv.
We updated the default values of each input data variable which are declared in the
generated SMV model (e.g. initial speed (10.0), desired speed (45.0), initial frontdistance
(150.0)). The STPA TCGenerator tool runs the NuSMV 2.6.0 model checking tool to verify
the generated SMV model file. The NuSMV model succeeded in verifying the generated SMV
model within 0.29 seconds and no further errors were reported. NuSMV consumed 42.10
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1 [ Test Case ID ] 2
2 [ Test Su i t e ID ] 2
3 [ Related STPA SSRs ]
4 SSR4 , SSR6 , SSR15 , SSR16
5 [ PreConditons ]
6 des i redSpeed =45.0
7 f r o n t d i s t a n c e =120.32
8 currentSpeed =44.0
9 s t a t e=Resume
10 [ Act ions ]
11 cont ro lAct i on=Acce l e ra t e
12 [ PostConditons ]
13 currentSpeed =45.0
14 s t a t e=Cruise
15 [ Comment ]
Fig. 10. An example of a generated safety-based test case
megabytes to store 2.31828e+17 states and performed 2.97418e+09 transitions. As a result,
all LTL formulae were satisfied and there is no counterexample generated because the safe
behavioural model itself was built from STPA software safety requirements.
6.3. Safety-based Test Case Generation from the Safe Test Model
After validating the correctness of the safe behavioural model, we used the STPA TC-
Generator to generate a hierarchical tree of the safe behavioural model which shows the
hierarchy levels of the safe test model. The STPA TCGenerator tool parses the tree of the
safe behavioural model recursively by considering super state decompositions AND STATE
(parallel) and OR STATE (exclusive) to automatically generate the safe test model as an
extended finite state machine. As a result, the generated safe test model contains 7 states
(after removing the super states) and 32 transitions (after maintaining the transitions of
super states). The tool automatically generates the traceability matrix between STPA soft-
ware safety requirements and the safe behavioural model and shows them in a table. All
input data variables with their data type, initial, minimum, maximum values which are
shown in the test input configuration view.
Before running the tool to generate the test cases, we set the number of test steps to
10 and selected the three test coverage criteria (state, transition and STPA software safety
requirements test coverage criteria). We selected the STPA software safety requirements
coverage as the stop condition of the test case generating algorithm. We also set the test
input value for each input data variable: power (true), desired speed (45 cm/sec), initial
speed (10 cm/sec), front distance (150 cm). Finally, we ran the STPA TCGenerator tool
three times to generate safety-based test cases from the test model, respectively : 1) depth-
first search, 2) breadth-depth-first search and 3) the combined algorithm. Table VI shows
the results of the generated safety-based test cases by each test algorithm. We could achieve
100% coverage of all the STPA software safe requirements which are linked to the safe test
model in the traceability matrix. Figure 10 shows an example of the format of documenting
each safety-based test case.
Based on the traceability matrix between the model and the STPA software safety re-
quirements, the STPA TCGenerator provides an individual coverage (how many test cases
TC covered each SSR) by each test algorithm (shown in Fig. 11).
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Table VI. The safety-based test cases generated by STPA TCGenerator tool
ID Test Al-
gorithm
Test
Steps
Test
Suite
Test
Cases
Time
(in Sec)
State Cov-
erage
Transition
Coverage
STPA SRR
Coverage
1 DFS 10 1 119 3 6/7 = 85.7% 23/32=71.9% 32/32=100%
2 BFS 10 4 24 1 6/7 = 85.7% 17/32=
53.1%
32/32=100%
3 Both 10 5 249 2 7/7 = 100% 18/32=
87.5%
32/32=100%
7. DISCUSSION
The manual construction of test cases is a hard, time-consuming and error-prone activity
that requires deep knowledge and expertise. Furthermore, the manual building of a test
model from system specifications with the purpose of generating test cases still needs a
proof of its correctness to ensure that the test model captures all specifications. One solution
is to automatically construct a test model for a given system and prove its correctness
by transforming it into an intermediate model that can be used as an input model of a
formal verification approach (e.g. model checker) to verify the generated model against its
specifications. In addition, the specifications should also be mapped from informal text to
the formal specifications. For this issue, we transformed the test model into the SMV model
and verified it by using the NuSMV model checker tool. However, the model transformation
process also needs a proof of the correctness of the resultant model, even though the model
checker did not induct any error. In our proposed approach, this issue remains as an open
issue for future work.
Traditionally, formal verification and testing are used to assess the functional requirements
and they do not directly concern safety. The idea behind the proposed approach is to
concentrate on the use of the STPA safety analysis to identify the hazardous situations that
the software can lead or contribute to and formalise the STPA software safety requirements
into a formal specification. The information derived from the STPA safety analysis will be
modelled into the test model.
A second issue is that the automation of the test case generation process can lead to a large
number of test cases that cover the same information. Reducing the number of generated
test cases is a major factor in evaluating the effectiveness of an automated testing tool and
the quality of the generated test cases. Therefore, we added a new test coverage criteria
(e,g. STPA software safety requirements) to stop the test case generating algorithm when
this criteria becomes 100% to ensure that each STPA safety requirement is covered at least
in one test case. Furthermore, the first prototype of the STPA TCGenerator tool supports
to generate test cases for each software safety requirement by automatically generating a
traceability matrix between the STPA software safety requirements and the safe test model.
The traceability matrix contains all relevant transitions of each software safety requirement
in the safe test model.
A limitation is that the process model variables in the STPA control structure diagram
visualized by XSTAMPP have no data types. Furthermore, XSTAMPP does not support
multi-levels hierarchies of the process model of the software controller in the control struc-
tures. That makes ensuring and checking the consistency between the hierarchy levels of the
process model in STPA and the stateflow model in Simulink a big challenge. For example,
the process model variable ACC Active in the ACC software controller has sub-process
model variables such as control speed and read sensor data which will be activated when
the ACC state is active. Therefore, it requires human effort to define the process model
hierarchy and map it to the Simulink stateflow model hierarchy level. Another limitation
is that the semantics of the stateflow model saves the information inside the state (e.g. the
name of the state and its entry, during, exit actions) in one attribute as a string, which
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Fig. 11. The total number of test cases for each STPA software safety requirement
makes the process of extracting information very buggy if this information is not separated
by semicolons and requires an effort to trace them.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced an automatic approach to generate safety-based test cases
based on the STPA safety analysis. Our approach concentrates on generating a set of test
cases for each STPA software safety requirement. The generated test cases will be used to
verify the safety of the software-intensive system under analysis. We also implemented an
open-source tool support that automates the safety-based test cases generating approach.
Furthermore, we illustrated the proposed approach with safety-critical software of an ACC
system with stop-and-go function. The results show that deriving test cases based on the
safety requirements is a practical and effective approach to generate different test cases to
recognize software risks and assure the software quality.
As a future work, there are many interesting directions and trends to extend the research
of safety-based testing for software-intensive systems and the automated tool support. We
plan to improve the tool by considering the other stateflow semantics which were not ad-
dressed in our approach such as inner transitions and connective and history junctions tran-
sitions. Furthermore, we aim to limit the number of the generated test cases, to improve
the traceability matrix by adding information about the maximum number of test cases for
each software safety requirement and also the priority value to generate a reasonable test
case for each software safety requirement.
To support software and safety engineers who use the XSTAMPP platform, we plan to
integrate it into the XSTAMPP platform to derive the test cases for each STPA software
safety requirement within the XSTAMPP platform. Furthermore, we plan to improve the
process model in the control structure diagram by allowing the safety analyst to define the
data type of each process model variable and draw the multi-hierarchy levels of the process
model variables. Finally, we plan to evaluate the proposed approach and the tool support
on a real software-intensive system with an industrial partner.
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